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Due Process for Public School Teachers
In Nonrenewal and Discharge Situations
By REYNOLDS C. SEITZ*

IT is a basic principle of constitutional law that actions

of public school
governing bodies (school districts, school boards, boards of regents)
are subject to the dictate of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution which provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'
The Fourteenth Amendment due process provision has both a
procedural and a substantive connotation. The substantive connotation deals with questions of deprivation by the state of a substantive
right such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, or freedom
to wear a hair or dress style. This article will not be concerned with
the substantive connotation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but will
deal exclusively with the protection of procedural rights. As the name
implies, the issue of procedural due process raises the question
as to
whether a state is following a fair procedure when it attempts to interfere with life, property or liberty. This discussion will concentrate
on an analysis of the procedural due process rights which teachers may
enjoy when the state takes certain actions which have an impact upon
their current employment. The article will not touch upon the due
process rights of students.
Before moving directly into the discussion suggested by the title
of this article, however, it is appropriate to outline briefly the attitude
of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the interpretation
given to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
* Professor (Dean 1953-1965) Marquette University Law School, past president National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, Editor-in-Chief NOLPE
School Law Reporter, member National Academy of Arbitrators, formerly on faculty
at Northwestern University and Assistant to Superintendent of Public Schools in
Omaha and St. Louis.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[881]
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Basic Concept of Procedural Due Process
From the earliest times the United States Supreme Court, in giving contour to the procedural concept of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause, has applied its judgment to the facts to determine
if it felt that fundamental fairness was accorded.2 There were efforts
made to obtain judicial approval of the theory that the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause incorporates the provisions of the first
eight amendments-those amendments known as the Bill of Rights
and aimed directly at the federal government. One of the first such
attempts was in a case challenging a California statute which provided
for prosecution by information for certain criminal offenses.3 The
statute was attacked on the ground that the Fifth Amendment required
indictment by grand jury and that this requirement was meant to be
incorporated as an element of due process and made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected the
idea on the ground that indictment by grand jury was not so basic
a right that due process could not be accorded without such a procedure. The Court felt that the states could use any procedure which
respects and preserves fundamental principles of liberty and justice.
It was the opinion of the Court that indictment by information met
this test.
A forceful example of the dependency of procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment upon judicial evaluation of what
constitutes fairness is seen in the cases involving the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the extent to which it is applicable to state procedures. In two cases, Twining v. New Jersey4 in
1908 and Adamson v. California5 in 1947, the Court refused to apply
the Fifth Amendment to the states, expressing the view that the privilege against self-incrimination had never been universally accepted
as a necessary concomitant of due process and hence was not within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 6 A dramatic
change in philosophy was announced by the Court in 1964 when it
came to the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination, although aimed directly at the federal government,
embodies a fundamental right which should be incorporated into the
2.
372 U.S.
2.
4.
5.
6.

See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright,
335 (1963); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
211 U.S. 78 (1908).
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908).
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7
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The fundamental fairness doctrine has also been applied where
the question of incorporation was not involved. For example, as recently as 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly,8 the Court decreed that public
assistance payments could not be terminated by New York State without according certain procedural due process protections.
Over the years, dissenting Justices have protested the use of the
fundamental fairness doctrine relied upon by the majority. In Adamson the majority said that the Bill of Rights was incorporated only to
the extent that the provision in question expressed a fundamental
right.' In response, Justice Black protested:
I . . . contend that the "natural law" formula which the Court
uses to reach its conclusion in this case should be abandoned as
an incongruous excresence on our Constitution ....

I fear to see the consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of decency and fundamental justice for the
language of the Bill of Rights .... 10
Justice Black's dissent was not confined to the issue of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. In the Goldberg" case he complained that the decision rested
upon "the collective judgment of the majority as to what would be
a fair and humane procedure . . ". He felt that this was an unsatisfactory basis for holding unconstitutional the procedure outlined by
the state legislature. A year earlier, in a case in which the Supreme
Court invalidated Wisconsin's garnishment procedure,"3 Black also
dissented, commenting:
The Court thus steps back into the due process philosophy which
brought on President Roosevelt's Court fight.
This holding savors too much of the "Natural Law," "Due Proctest of what is constitutional for me
ess," "Shock-the-conscience"
14
to agree to the decision.
In spite of the dissenting philosophy of Justice Black, the concept
of fundamental fairness has continued to play a role in cases involving
7.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Id. at 75, 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).

13.

Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

14.

Id. at 345, 350 (Black, J.,dissenting).
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the adequacy of procedural due process. Although the principle will
not produce decisions which will bring universal approval, it is submitted that it is hard to challenge the appropriateness of the technique.
It seems unreasonable to deny to a court the opportunity to react to
the adequacy of procedure on the basis of its fundamental fairness.
This article will comment upon the concept of fundamental fairness
as applied -to cases involving due process for public school teachers
in nonrenewal of contract or discharge situations.
Recent Supreme Court Cases Involving Teachers
In determining what constitutes procedural due process in teacher
nonrenewal of contract and dismissal situations, it is necessary to deal
directly with the issue of whether there is a property right or a liberty
right as those terms are used in the Fourteenth Amendment. Two
United States Supreme Court cases, Board of Regents v. Roth" and
Perry v. Sindermann,"6 decided in the middle of 1972, turned on this
issue. In Roth the Court emphasized that "[t]he requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.' 7 On the basis of finding no invasion of a property or liberty
interest, the majority concluded that the teacher Roth had no right
to a hearing before nonrenewal of his contract. Roth makes it very
clear, however, that Justices can differ sharply on what constitutes a
protected property or liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the three dissenting opinions presented some very potent arguments.
It is necessary at this point to analyze some of the salient points
made by the majority in Roth. Roth was not a tenured teacher. Under Wisconsin statutes he could attain tenure as a permanent employee
only after four years of year-to-year employment. The Court held
that in merely declining to re-employ him the Board of Regents had
not abridged any property right. The Court said:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.18
In distinguishing the case from Goldberg the majority pointed
15.
16.
17.
18.

408 U.S. 564 (1972).
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
Id. at 577.
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out that in the latter case the right to welfare payments "was grounded
in the statute defining eligibility for them ' 19 and the recipients had
a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to prove eligibility,
whereas in Roth,
the respondent's "property" interest in employment at Wisconsin
State University-Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms
of his appointment . . . . [R]espondent's employment was to
terminate on June 30. They did not provide for contract renewal
absent "sufficient cause."
Indeed, they made no provision for re20
newal whatsoever.
With respect to the question of whether there was a protected
liberty interest, the Court remarked: "It stretches the concept too far
to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not
2' 1
rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. 1
In response to this point, Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent
that the case was different from Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v.
McElroy,22 upon which the majority relied, because in McElroy the
government was prepared to offer to employ the worker at another
nearby restaurant, while in Roth the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract
"can be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively
limits any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher, at
23
least in his State."
Justice Marshall, also dissenting, argued that
the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
to secure. [The Court] has also established that the fact that
an employee has no contract guaranteeing work for a specific future period does not mean that as the result of action by government he may
24 be "discharged at any time for any reason or for
no reason."1
Marshall stressed the idea that employment is one of the greatest benefits that government has to offer, saying: "When something as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may not
reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its ac25
tions are fair and equitable.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 575.
367 U.S. 886 (1961).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 585 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissent-

ing).
24. Id. at 588 (Marshall, J.,dissenting), quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,

38, 41 (1915).
25.

Id. at 589.
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Under the circumstances the dissenters felt that Roth was entitled
to know the reasons for his nonrenewal and to have a chance to respond.
Evaluation of the Supreme Court Philosophy
If one agrees with the majority opinion in Roth relative to the
property and liberty interests involved, it would be difficult to quarrel
with the Court's position that Roth was not entitled to a hearing.
Since fairness of procedure is the underlying issue, however, the
Court's firm stand on the nonexistence of a property or liberty interest
seems questionable in view of the forceful and logical argument of
the dissenters. The dissenters at least raised the property and liberty
issue to the position of a very close question. Thus it seems proper
to suggest that if the Court could have protected the interest of the
school board, while at the same time ordering a procedure which
would have accorded fundamental fairness to a probationary teacher,
it should have done so. It is submitted that the Court could have
done this by declaring that probationary teachers who are not going
to be offered a new contract be entitled to know the reasons for such
determination and to have an opportunity for a hearing before the
school board.
It is apparent that underlying the Roth decision was the feeling
of the Court that the statute in question had a rational basis. That
is, it was not unreasonable to provide for a trial period, during which
a teacher could be evaluated, before granting tenured status with its
attendant protection against arbitrary dismissal. It is equally apparent
that the Court felt that if the trial period evaluation should lead to
a decision not to renew the contract of a teacher, the school board
should not be saddled with a burdensome hearing.
These considerations are not without merit. It is suggested, however, that if the teacher is given a right to know the reasons for the
nonrenewal, and is permitted to appear before the school board to
respond or to undertake the burden of proving arbitrary action or the
invasion of First Amendment rights, no unfair burden has been placed
upon the school board. Rather, the teacher has been accorded "fundamental fairness." The argument against implementing this type of
procedure is that it will open the door to litigation, and thereby put
an undue burden on the board. These effects are not the necessary
consequences of such a procedure. In confining the due process
rights of a probationary teacher to a statement of the reasons for nonrenewal of the contract and a chance to appear before the school
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board, nothing more has been done than to permit the teacher to assess his chances of convincing the board of the arbitrariness of the
evaluation or of a violation of First Amendment fights. Counsel
should advise teachers in such situations that in most instances a court
review would involve a fruitless expenditure of time and money because a review court will not overrule the judgment of a school board
unless it finds that such action was arbitrary or unconstitutional. The
chief judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin put this rationale accurately when he said:
[The courts are not the proper agency to administer the school
system. Judges simply lack the information and the expertise
needed to sit in review of a school board's personnel decisions.
A court's scope of review must, therefore, be so confined that only
patently arbitrary or baseless dismissals are invalidated. 26
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Roth outlined the minimal procedural due process rights that should be accorded a probationary
teacher. He quoted approvingly the words of the District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin:
[M]inimal procedural due process includes a statement of the reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor, notice
of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated reasons, and
a hearing if the professor appears at the appointed time and place.
At such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The burden
of going forward and the burden of proof rests with the professor.
Only if he makes a reasonable showing that the stated reasons
are wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision or that they are
wholly without basis in fact would the university administration
become obliged to show that the stated
2 7 reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact.
In a footnote in Carpenter v. City of Greenfield School District
No. 6,28 the court made clear that -its scope of review would be greater
if the dismissal is alleged to be in retaliation for the exercise of First
Amendment rights.2 9 In regard to First Amendment rights, a probationary teacher may obtain judicial review even under the present case
law. It seems, however, that a strong argument in support of a teacher's right to reasons for dismissal is the need to know if such action
was motivated by a spirit of retaliation for speech or association.
Limiting the rights of a probationary teacher to a statement of
26. Carpenter v. City of Greenfield School Dist. No. 6, 358 F. Supp. 220, 226
(E.D. Wis. 1973).
27. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 585-86 (1972) (Douglas, I., dissenting).
28. 358 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
29. Id. at 226 n.2.
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reasons and an opportunity for a hearing before the school board
would be in accord with the general doctrine that the power of the
court in due process cases extends only to a determination of the particular form of due process required in a specific fact situation.30 This
limitation is justified on the ground that a greater extension of rights
would ignore the fact that a school board should have great discretion
in evaluating a teacher during the probationary years and that the
court must refrain from conferring tenure by judicial decree.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that even these limited procedural requirements put some burden on the school board. But the
burden is outweighed by the need to treat a teacher with fundamental
fairness. It seems grossly unfair to erect a barrier which makes proof
of arbitrary action all but impossible. Even where reasons for dismissal are given, the teacher will find it most difficult to establish arbitrary
action. But the teacher at least should have the right to try.
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Roth makes several very thought
provoking comments on the value of reasons and a hearing. On the
subject of giving reasons he says:
[I]t is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist ...
As long as the government has a good reason for its actions it
need not fear disclosure. It is only where the government acts
improperly that procedural due process is 3 truely
burdensome.
1
And that is precisely when it is most necessary.
On the subject of a hearing before the school board, Marshall
stated:
It might also be argued that to require a hearing and statement of reasons is to require a useless act, because a government
bent on denying employment to one or more persons will do so
regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed in its path.
Perhaps this is so, but a requirement of procedural regularity at
least renders arbitrary action more difficult. Moreover, proper
procedures will surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that results, not from malice, but from innocent error .

.

.

When gov-

ernment knows it may have to justify its decisions with sound reas32
ons, its conduct is likely to be more cautious, careful and correct.
The suggestion that the Court need not have interpreted the concepts of liberty and property so narrowly, in view of the fact that the
primary concern in procedural due process cases is the question of
fundamental fairness, is especially applicable to the decision of the
30.
ciates the
31.
ing).
32.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), is a leading recent case which enunprinciple. See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissentId. at 591-92.
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Court in Perry v. Sindermann 3 In Sindermann the Court was dealing with a situation in which there was no state legislation respecting
tenure. The teacher involved had received four year-to-year contracts
from the district. The Court rejected the "expectancy of continued
employment" test as a basis for determining whether Fourteenth
Amendment protections were applicable. In place of this test the
Court insisted that there must be some proof showing that the school
system had a de facto tenure program. The Court recognized that the
absence of a formal understanding may not always foreclose the possibility of an implied right to contract renewal.
The pronouncement in Sindermann that "expectancy" of employment is not sufficient to establish the requisite interests protected by
the Due Process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment is even more
difficult to accept in light of the arguments made by the Roth dissenters. It is not unrealistic to argue that a teacher who has been employed in a district for four or more years has a significant interest
in the renewal of his contract which entitles him to a statement of
reasons for nonrenewal and a chance for -a hearing before the board
of education at which arbitrary action might be proved. The granting
of such procedural protection does not contravene the intent of the
legislature not to give tenure. For reasons discussed previously in this
article, the burden upon the school board is not great when balanced
against the consideration of fairness. The procedures outlined above
do not constitute tenure by judicial decree, nor do they thrust upon
the board the burden of proving a "for cause" reason for dismissal
as in the case of a tenured teacher.
Some states have a tenure statute. In such states, a teacher who
starts in a probationary status hopes that he will ultimately attain tenure. In other states no tenure statutes exist, and teachers are awarded
year-to-year contracts.
The latter was the case in Sindermann.
Should the argument in favor of the giving of reasons and the opportunity to be heard before the school board be any weaker when no
tenure statute exists than when a teacher starts work with the ultimate
hope of attaining tenure? For all the reasons previously enunciated
it would seem not. Of course, it should be possible for a school board
to hire a teacher to fill a temporary vacancy under a contract for temporary employment.
Recognized Property and Liberty Rights
It now becomes necessary to return to an examination of Roth
33.

408 US. 593 (1972).
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to determine those situations which would entitle a probationary
teacher to procedural due process under the tests set forth by the majority opinion.
The following teachers were said to have a protected property
interest: (1) the tenured teacher;3 4 (2) the teacher with a contract
for a specified term whom the board seeks to dismiss during such
term;3" and (3) the teacher who has a clearly implied promise of continued employment. 6
The following teachers were said to have a protected liberty
interest: (1) the teacher denied renewal for a stated reason (such
as immorality or dishonesty) which would damage his standing in the
community; 7 and (2) the teacher foreclosed from other employment
opportunities because of a stigma or disability imposed upon him by
the board.3 8
Unanswered Questions
The listing of the property and liberty interests which the Court
indicated it would recognize leaves many questions unanswered. Indeed, one writer, who argued Sindermann before the United States
Supreme Court, has commented that in the Roth and Sindermann
cases the Court "took an area where the lower courts were confused,
and in two brief decisions turned confusion into utter chaos."3 9
A great deal of litigation will undoubtedly be devoted to determining whether a teacher has a clearly implied promise of employment. Sindermann held that the teacher was entitled to a trial in
which the court would determine whether in a particular fact situation
the teacher had an objective, as opposed to a subjective, expectancy
that he would be reemployed.
It seems predictable that much litigation will concern the issue
of possible damage to reputation arising out of particular methods of
announcing the reasons for dismissal. Suppose the reason is released
only to the teacher and is otherwise known only to a few school administrators and members of the school board and there is no evidence
of further dissemination. Would there be the requisite damage to
34. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 577.
37. Id. at 573.
38. Id.
39. Gottesman, Due Process For Untenured Teachers From the Teacher's Viewpoint, FRONTIERS OF SCHOOL LAW 5 (1973).
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standing in the community? Will litigation be required on the extent
of dissemination?
The Court noted only two types of reasons which might result
in damage to reputation, namely, immorality and dishonesty. What
if the reason given was one of the following: incompetence, insubordination, irresponsibility or neglect of duty? If such reasons were
known in the community, would the Court feel there was the requisite
damage to reputation? The Court did say that "[w]here a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
are essential."4
The citations in support of this principle include a
case in which a Wisconsin statute made it possible to publicly proclaim
in bars that liquor was not to be served to a named alcoholic; 4 1 other
cases involved loyalty to country.4
In these cases, the damage to
good name, reputation and honor was not difficult to establish. Will
the Court be as willing to see the damage when the reasons are incompetence, irresponsibility, insubordination or neglect of duty on the
part of a professional teacher? An affirmative answer would mitigate
the lack of fundamental fairness implicit in the Roth decision. But
will the answer be yes?
It certainly was not the answer given by the United States District
Court in Pennsylvania. In Berry v. Hamblin4 8 a teacher was told that
her contract was not renewed because of "inadequate attention to students who do not excel at sports, hostility to colleagues, indifference
to rules and regulations of the physical education department, and failure to evidence potential for professional growth."4 4 In denying the
teacher a right to a hearing the court said:
[W]hile these charges may injure Plaintiff's professional reputation, they are not the type of charges which entitle her to a hearing. A discharge based upon a charge of immorality, debauchery
or disloyalty to the nation may be a badge of infamy. Hence
the dismissed employee who has been charged has a right to a
hearing to controvert the charges. Discharge based on allegedly
poor professional performance is not a badge of infamy. 45
The reasoning of this court supports the thesis that when the ex40. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972), quoting Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
41. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
42. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Facist Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
43. 356 F. Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
44. Id. at 308.
45. Id.
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istence or nonexistence of a protected property or liberty interest is
a close question, the concept of fundamental fairness could well have
induced the Supreme Court to give minimal hearing rights (delineated
previously in this article) to a nontenured teacher whose contract is
not renewed.
Another question which is certain to be litigated in the future
is whether a teacher has been foreclosed from other employment opportunities because of a stigma or disability imposed by the board.
In Roth the Court made very clear that the mere decision by the board
of regents not to renew the contract did not of itself establish that
the teacher was foreclosed from taking other employment. Citing
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,4 6 a case which involved admission to the State of New Mexico Bar, the Court did say, however,
that the "State, in regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose a range of opportunities 'in a manner...
that contravene[s] . . . Due Process'.1 47 This statement seems to indicate clearly that the Court at least is willing to consider whether there
has been a foreclosing of opportunities in the teaching profession. It
is clear, though, that the court will require evidence which demonstrates
that the nonrenewed teacher had actually tried and was unable to find
employment. The United States District Court in California 8 addressed
itself to the question of the quantity and quality of evidence needed.
The court said it wanted to know how widely the nonrenewed teacher
had applied for employment. It did not specify, however, how many
letters of application would have to be sent or how many potential employers would have to be contacted.
A question which was not answered in the Roth case is whether
a teacher whose contract was not renewed could attempt to prove inability to obtain new employment on the ground that he was unable
to give reasons for nonrenewal when asked to do so by prospective
employers. In this connection if the prospective employer writes the
former employer and secures the reasons from him, and the teacher
is not employed, is he at that point entitled to a hearing?
The next matter requiring analysis and discussion is the extent
of procedural due process to which a teacher is entitled if it can be
demonstrated that a property or liberty interest exists under the tests
outlined in the Roth and Sindermann decisions.
46.

353 U.S. 232 (1957).

47.

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 574 (1972).

48.

Perkins v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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Form of Hearing When Property or Liberty Interest Present

It is clear that even where a hearing is required by due process
the kind or form of that hearing may vary according to circumstances.
In Fuentes v. Shevin49 the United States Supreme Court stated:
[Tihe Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the

form of a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case," and
"depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the
nature of the subsequent proceedings [if any] .... 50
The Goldberg5 1 case set forth the form of hearing which the Supreme Court felt was required in an administrative hearing held prior
to the termination of public assistance payments to a particular individual. The Court stressed the right of the welfare recipient to appear
personally and make an oral presentation, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses relied upon by the government department,
the right to have counsel if desired, and the right to have the decision rendered by an impartial person, that is, one who had not participated in the decision under review.
Since the property interest is clearly discernible in the case of
a tenured teacher, or of a teacher who is dismissed during a contract
term, or of a teacher who has a clearly implied promise of continued
employment, it would seem that no valid reason could be presented
for denying the form of due process specified in Goldberg. Of course,
procedure is often specified in a tenure statute. If such procedure
is not in accord with the dictates of due process, the legislation should
be subject to attack on that ground.
In McNeill v. Butz52 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the United States Department of Agriculture had discharged a
nontenured employee on the basis of charges of the type that the Supreme Court in Roth recognized as infringing upon a liberty interest.
The court stressed the importance of confrontation and the right of
cross-examination as a requirement of procedural due process. The
court commented:
[W]here untenured federal non-civil service employees are dismissed and permanently disqualified from future employment on
the basis of secret charges which impugn their honesty and integrity, and where they have made timely and good faith requests
to confront their nameless accusers, procedural due process requires that the government provide an opportunity to refute the
49. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
50. Id. at 82 (ciations omitted).
51. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
52. 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973).
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charges by confronting and cross-examining such adverse witnesses
53

Quoting Justice Frankfurter, the court went on to say:
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for the
elementary rights of man, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness
by secret, one-sided determination of facts
can rarely be obtained
54
decisive of rights.
If the teacher can submit proof showing that employment opportunities have been foreclosed sufficient to meet the Sindermann test,
there would seem to be no logical reason why he should not be entifled to the form of due process delineated in Goldberg.
There may be an argument that the Goldberg form of hearing
right need not be given if provision is made for a de novo form of
court review. It could then be asserted that all that was necessary
at the school board level would be an opportunity to respond informally to charges. It could be argued that the insistence in Goldberg
on a prior administrative hearing was due to the particular circumstances of the case. It is true that Goldberg can be distinguished
on its facts. 55 There appears to be, however, another reason why
teachers should be given the type of hearing described in Goldberg.
As noted previously, the teacher who has property and liberty interests
ought to have a more formal hearing before an administrative body
which has some expertise in educational matters.
One of the Goldberg requirements-that the final decision should
not be made by one who participated in the investigation or in the
preliminary determinations on the question under review-requires
special analysis. It has been contended that this requirement necessitates having the matter heard and decided by a neutral person who
has no connection with the school district. To date this contention
has not met with favorable response from the courts. The widely respected Second Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that:
The constitutional rule sought here would require that decisions as
to teacher competence be surrendered to a body less familiar with
relevant considerations and not responsible under state and local
law for making these decisions. Moreover, it is unrealistic to require a Connecticut town to provide more than one body to deal
with various aspects of school administration. We do not believe
53. Id. at 325.
54. Id., quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. 123, 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55. In Goldberg, it can be argued that there were exigent circumstances, that is,
the welfare payments were to be terminated immediately.
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that due process. . requires so much. . . absent a showing of
actual, rather than potential, bias. 86
The court, of course, recognized that there would be a violation
of due process if one who investigates and makes recommendations
to dismiss was also entrusted with the rendering of the final decision.
However, the Second Circuit was not willing to find a violation of due
process merely because the minutes of a board meeting held three
weeks prior to the hearing indicated that it "concurred" in the superintendent's initial nonrenewal decision. The court noted:
[Tihe district judge found that no actual Board vote was taken
at that time, that the Superintendent was at all times the moving
force in the matter of tenure denial, and that the clerk transcribing
the minutes merely inferred, sua sponte, that all members agreed
with the Superintendent's recommendation-a decision that would
initially be communicated to the Board in the normal course of
school administration, well before any hearing on its merits. The
very limited nature of the school board's prior involvement here
is entirely consistent with due process."
Conclusion
This article has expressed the view that in Roth the United States
Supreme Court would have been justified under the concept of fundamental fairness in recognizing a property or liberty interest sufficient
to require at least minimal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This outcome would have been in full accord with the expressed feeling of the United States District Court for Northern Illinois that "liberty and property were never intended to be rigidly defined."5r8 The Roth Court, however, did not do that, and there is no
reason to believe that any changes will be made in this regard.
It is certain that many individual teachers and teacher associations
are disturbed by the failure of the Court in Roth and Sindermann to
give minimal procedural due process rights to probationary and nontenured teachers who cannot demonstrate the requisite liberty and
property interest demanded by the Court. In light of the growing
militancy of teacher association groups at the negotiating table, this
disturbance will undoubtedly lead to effort to gain minimal due process rights at the bargaining table. The negotiations are very likely
to be aimed at getting terms in the agreement which will clarify some
of the "liberty" and "property" concepts left uncertain by the Roth
and Sindermann decisions. These efforts are likely to succeed in
56. Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Miller v. School Dist., 354 F. Supp. 922, 925 (N.D. Il. 1973).
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many of those states having statutes which encourage good faith negotiations or in those states which recognize as valid a contract negotiated voluntarily. In some states statutes may stand in the way of
obtaining such due process procedures through negotiation. Since it
is only a procedure that is being negotiated, however, there would
not be a direct invasion of school board management rights, and thus
the statute would have to be very direct to preclude the negotiation.
In any event, the Roth and Sindermann holdings will not make
life any easier for school boards. There is bound to be extensive litigation aimed at clarifying the loose definitions of "liberty" and "property" and at attempting to establish factually that the requisite interests
do exist.
One matter which seems certain to be brought before the courts
is the claim that, as far as service in the district is concerned, a time
will be reached at which the nontenured teacher must be considered
to have more than a mere subjective expectation of employment and,
therefore, be entitled to the Goldberg type of procedural due process
protections. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has already reacted
to such an assertion.59 The teacher involved had 29 years of service
in the district. The court held that a teacher might support her due
process claim by showing de facto tenure amounting to a property interest, or by showing such injury to her professional reputation and
livelihood, caused by the termination of her lengthy service, as to
amount to an infringement of liberty. This reasoning appears very
logical and the only question would seem to be the length of service
necessary to warrant this result.
Although questions of demotion, transfer, and suspension of
teachers are beyond the scope of the title of this article, it seems appropriate to conclude with a quotation from the attorney for the San
Diego City Schools. Writing in Frontiers of School Law he asserted:
The generality and vagueness of the majority's opinion in Roth
and Sindermann, in concert with the strong views expressed by
several dissenting opinions, leave considerable room for arguing
forcefully and persuasively that the broad principles enunciated in
the two cases apply also to the involuntary demotion, transfer, or
suspension of a teacher . . . . These issues will be resolved in
future lawsuits. 60

59. Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
60. Shannon, Due Process for Non-Tenured Teachers From the Board's Viewpoint, FRONTIERS OF SCHOOL LAW 15, 24 (1973).

